Identity management is an area that has proved challenging for many e-service providers such as e-banks. The problem is how to authenticate on-line consumers at the initial point of registration and also how to reauthenticate on-line customers each time they wish to access e-banking services. Hitherto, e-banks have adopted several different technological approaches to user authentication. These include traditional user passwords, as well as one-time passwords that necessitate the user operating a specialist device. In order to more fully conceptualise the area it is proposed that e-banks should classify the available and emerging using that we call a "Sign Based Identity Management" approach. One emergent solution is considered in more detail: namely template free biometric authentication. Our contribution suggests that the hitherto neglected area of biometric user authentication for e-banking may not only be more robust than existing whilst also meeting many of the requirements (security, usability, strong trust model, less vulnerable to replay attacks) of existing methods.
INTRODUCTION
E-banking providers have deployed a range of techniques to handle on-line user authentication. The use of user passwords being ubiquitous and chipand-pin cards (with passwords) is commonplace. Biometric techniques have hitherto tended to have been dismissed too often by the banking industry as a whole as being inherently too vulnerable to replay attacks or loss of identity templates leading to an unacceptable risk of loss of identity (Venkatraman and Delpachitra, 2008) . There may also deeper organisational cultural reasons for the lack of adoption of biometrics within banking more generally to due to a risk aversion culture and technological conservatism (Constanzo 2006) . For example the guidance issued by relevant authorities such as the Federal Finance Examinations Council (http://www.ffiec.gov) tends to stress the importance of risk management and the increasing dangers of identity theft in relation to tried and tested methods, rather than promoting the adoption of novel methods. This has led to a culture of conservativism in terms of adopting new technologies, despite the rise in criminal abuse. For example, the FSA (Financial Services Authority) recently identify a worrying rise in online banking fraud losses totalling some £21.4m during the six month to June 2008 , a 185% rise compared to 2007 (Financial Crime Newsletter, 2007 . Similarly, a recent IBM report (IBM Internet Security Systems X-Force®, 2008) identifies USA and UK based e-banking fraud as one of the fastest growing area of on-line crime. Phishing attacks for example are targeted mainly at USA and UK based e-banks (88%), with a further 8% targeted at financial payment sites. This is due to the high economic return of investment for criminals. Traditional well tried and trusted methods of operating secure e-banking predominate. However the rise of e-crime may force e-banking providers to consider new approaches. Later, we identify a novel variant template free (voice based) biometric as offering an alternative for e-bank authentication both at the initial customer e-banking enrolment stage and also beyond enrolment for users on a regular day-to-day basis. The main potential advantage is that (unlike traditional biometric methods) there is no need to generate a client template from a presented biometric. The method is still emerging from the research literature and has not been specifically tailored for e-banking use. Rather, limited trials and test-beds have demonstrated proof-of-concept results using voice speech samples (Wisse, 2006) . The semiotic paradigm has offered little support for identity management. Only Wisse (Athan and Howells, 2009 ) has offered a theoretical extension to Peirce's triadic model of semiosis to take into account the additional complexities of mapping a biological identity to virtual identities. We go on to ground our contribution within a semiotic analytic approach to trusted authentication. This can be seen as a natural extension to a generic semiotic account of an E-trust framework most recently articulated within French (French, 2009 ).
IDENTITY MANAGEMENT:
A SEMIOTIC ANALYSIS
Previously one of us has suggested that a novel trust ladder a novel and tailored variant of Stamper's well known semiotic ladder (Stamper, 1973) can prove to be invaluable conceptual tool to clarify matters of trust and security issues in the context of e-bank web-site design as well as in the context of SSL/TLS client-server exchanges (Bacharach and Gambetta, 1997) . Cryptographic ciphers, entropy, channel capacity, e.g. RSA For each of the layers of the semiotic trust ladder (a close variant of Stamper's famous ladder) an exemplar security/trust aspect is indicated. Clearly the development of a semiotics of security and trust forms a much larger research agenda. This task lies outside the scope of the present paper, though this paper forms a minor contribution to this research agenda. Indeed, that the ladder may prove to be useful in the analysis and classification of e-banking user authentication methods and hence establish a kind of taxonomy of identity management that we coin as Sign Based Identity Management (SBIM). SBIM is intended to reveal the inherent characteristics and vulnerabilities of well known user authentication methods used by e-banks and seek to map these to the various layers of the semiotic trust ladder. The trust ladder is reproduced as Figure 1 above.
Semiotic trust ladder
We suggest that the ladder may prove to be useful in the analysis and classification of e-banking user authentication methods and hence establish a kind of taxonomy of identity management. SBIM is intended to reveal the inherent characteristics and vulnerabilities of well known user authentication methods used by e-banks and seek to map these to the various layers of the semiotic trust ladder. Tables 1 and 2 that follow present a tentative mapping of key user authentication methods to signs and signal exchanges and known vulnerabilities. This mapping effectively re-factors authentication in terms of the signs and signals being exchanged. It can be seen in Table 1 below that traditional methods suffer from well known weaknesses of social engineering whilst the low adoption of onetime passwords suggests user resistance to adoption. Credentials such as smart cards and chip-and-pin cards suffer from problems of 'cloning' and also offer the possibility of a user presenting such credentials under duress. It has recently been suggested that the optimal (future) method of initial registration identity verification in an EU context may be the use of EU ID cards (Naumann, 2009). Such credentials may be relatively easy to clone. Table 1 , contains an entry marked 'template free' biometrics. We later seek to demonstrate applicability to e-banking user registration and site usage through the use of a use case based overview, with supportive mathematical underpinning. SBIM's "added value" is to seek to reveal clearly that every method has known weaknesses and that these are related to the nature of the signs being exchanged at various levels of the trust ladder. 
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Syntactic level Can be re-issued Tables 2 and 3 show how passwords present a relatively high risk of compromise as compared to template free biometrics, when examined in terms of their vulnerabilities. This is because any adversary would typically need to mimic genuine signs at multiple layers of system and user abstraction, making the task potentially harder. Passwords offer more vulnerable layers (higher risk) than biometrics.
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• In the context of e-banking the system dynamics are: large scalability, high-volume, high accuracy and reliability. The analysis presented earlier suggests that e-banks should consider supplementing their use of passwords and/or smart cards with a template free biometric approach. Organizations are using or actively considering multi-factor authentication techniques, despite increased management overheads (Chiasson, 2008) .
VOICE BASED TEMPLATE FREE USER AUTHENTICATION AND E-BANKING
Overview
The traditional procedure for opening an on-line bank account (enrolment) typically involves the customer entering a high-street branch and presenting evidence of ID, a copy of their signature and evidence of domicile. The bank often checks the credit score of the customer, and after these checks are made the customer is mapped to one or more accounts. Later, the customer receives bank credentials (e.g. card, passwords etc.) that enable transactions to be made on-line. A variation of the above process involves the initial capture of information from an on-line customer, followed by verification of identity (offline) and issuance of credentials to the customer so that the account can be activates and operated online. Atah and Howells (Athan and Howells, 2009) claim to have developed a so called template free authentication system. Here the encryption key is devised directly from the measured features. It should be noted that a simple hash algorithm would not be appropriate in this situation as even a small change in the recorded features would imply a completely different hashed value. The algorithm uses voice features, normalizes them and produces data which is discretised. The use of voice based template free biometric would typically involve an initial visit to a branch followed by seamless on-line usage. Thus the initial workload of enrolment would be somewhat higher than the traditional method. This (recording) would need to be accompanied by manual ID document presentation as in the traditional method for additional security reasons.
The e-banking customer presents a voice biometric, by means of any voice enabled IP connected device. To avoid replay attacks a daily 'passphrase' could be embedded within their free voice text entry.
Empiric Level: A Novel Centred Discretisation Approach
In an e-banking context it is always the case that an e-bank needs to verify that the presented credential matches the stored credential. The most vulnerable situation is that of an e-bank storing the clear text voice sample (as shown in Figure 2 ). In this case if the sample is stolen a person's identity is also stolen. A better case is when the e-bank stores only a hashed value of a voice sample. In this case loss would not result in a loss of identity due to the difficulty of reversing such hash functions. The difficulty of generating a unique hash value from differing presented voice samples generated by the customer remains problematic. Our solution is based upon centred discretisation techniques. These techniques retain the advantages of template free biometric method (no potential loss of identity if the discretised samples are stolen) whilst enhancing the practicability of an e-bank correctly matching the hashed values of the presented credential to the stored credential. We suggest that centred discretisation provides a potentially more stable approach, as depicted schematically in Figure 3 below. 
